Today, the Commission proposes to restructure the governance and funding of the Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”). This proposal represents an important step toward improving regulatory efficiency and accountability by aligning responsibility for the CAT’s governance and funding with responsibility for its oversight and use.
As Commissioner Dan Gallagher noted in 2012, the CAT was developed to “provide the Commission with data and other information that is critical to satisfying our statutory missions, and allowing us to oversee the markets in a smart and efficient manner.”[1]
However, the initial decision to establish the CAT through a national market system (“NMS”) plan has had far-reaching consequences. Under the existing framework, the CAT is governed by a committee of self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), each with its own interests, priorities, and responsibilities. This decentralized structure has resulted in protracted decision-making, disputes over governance and funding, and substantial increases in operating costs.
When the CAT NMS plan was approved in 2016, its annual operating costs were estimated at approximately $55 million.[2] By 2024, the projected annual operating budget approached $250 million.[3] Although recent efforts have reduced these expenditures,[4] the magnitude of cost increases has raised serious questions about whether the existing governance structure provides appropriate incentives for fiscal discipline.
The Commission itself has played a significant role in CAT’s rising costs, having established the CAT’s initial reporting framework and subsequently expanded its scope and functionality.[5] Most importantly, Commission staff are among the principal users, if not the primary users, of CAT data and rely on this information to carry out many regulatory functions. Yet the Commission has not borne direct financial responsibility for the costs associated with its regulatory decisions. Instead, those costs have fallen on the SROs, their members, and ultimately, at least in part, investors.
When decision-makers are insulated from the financial consequences of their decisions, incentives for cost discipline and careful cost-benefit evaluation are diminished. The Commission should be responsible for the costs of operating the regulatory infrastructure that it requires and relies upon.
Today’s proposal is designed to address the existing structural deficiencies by rescinding Rule 613, replacing the existing NMS plan reporting framework with a Commission rule, and facilitating the transfer of CAT governance to the Commission. The Commission also anticipates funding CAT operations through Congressional appropriations, subjecting these expenditures to the same budgetary discipline and oversight that applies to other Commission activities. The proposed approach would better align the authority to make decisions about the CAT with responsibility for the costs of those decisions.
Many thanks to the Division of Trading and Markets, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, the Office of General Counsel, and others at the Commission for their thoughtful work on this proposal. I also thank the SROs and other market participants for their considerable efforts in developing and operating the CAT.
The question is not whether regulators should have access to an effective consolidated audit trail—it is whether the current structure is the most accountable and efficient way to operate one. Importantly, the proposal would preserve the CAT’s core regulatory functionality while establishing a more sustainable and accountable framework for its future operation. For these reasons, I am pleased to support the proposal and look forward to commenters’ views on how the Commission can best improve the CAT’s governance and funding.


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